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Plutchok: Is a "Hit-and-Wait" Really Any Better Than a "Hit-and-Run"?

NOTE
IS A "HIT-AND-WAIT" REALLY ANY BETTER
THAN A "HIT-AND-RUN"?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a driver making his way home after a long day's work with
his mind on a myriad things. Perhaps he is thinking about the football
score, the lottery drawing, the weekend, or any number of things. He
comes over a hill when suddenly from out of nowhere a pedestrian steps
out into the street. He slams on the brakes but, in his mind, knows it is
too late. There is a terrible moment immediately before the impact where
the driver is hoping that there may just be enough time to stop or
perhaps swerve out of the way; then, the awful impact. From the
moment of any accident the driver must immediately decide, should I
stay or should I go?
To most of us the proper choice seems obvious, both legally and
morally-stay. The driver involved in an accident must stay at the scene
until the proper authorities arrive. 1 Yet, every year in the United States,
nearly 1500 drivers make the dreadful choice to flee the scene of fatal
accidents. 2 What makes these drivers flee is not abundantly clear. Some
psychologists explain that the drivers flee due to sheer panic, shame, or
the overwhelming fear of criminal repercussions.' This reasoning is even
cited in a North Carolina case.' Law enforcement sources explain that in
1. See William L. O'Malley, Legislation, 6 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 372, 376 (1931)
(explaining how the law that requires a driver in an accident to remain and assist the injured victim
"amounts to nothing more than raising to a legal status a duty which at common law was considered
only moral").
2. See Press Release, AAA Found. for Traffic Safety, Hit and Run Drivers Kill Nearly 1500
People Annually with Pedestrians at Greatest Risk (May 2015), https://www.aaafoundation.org/
sites/default/files/HitandRun.pdf.
3. See Meredith Cohn, Experts Work to Understand Psychology of Hit-and-Run: Fear,
Shame, Intoxication Can Overwhelm Self-Control, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 2015, at IA (explaining how
the "fight or flight" instinct may kick in while the driver is under immense stress and cause the
driver to make irrational decisions); see also Michael E. Young, Psychologists Cite Panicas Reason
Hit-Run DriversFlee, BALT. SUN, July 13, 1992, at 1A.
4. See Powell v. Doe, 473 S.E.2d 407, 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("Human nature being as it
is, it is conceivable that the hit and run driver left the scene out of panic.").
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many instances this fear is unfounded, as the driver will only face legal
trouble if the cause of the accident was due to criminal behavior such as
drunkenness or failure to abide by the rules of the road.5 Some law
enforcement sources believe that many of these fleeing drivers chose to
flee because they had some other reason to fear the law, such as
outstanding warrants, drunk driving, or illegal status.6
Whatever the reason is that drivers choose to flee, the results are
devastating, as the entire cost of the accident is now shouldered by the
victim as opposed to the driver or the driver's insurance. 7 As one court
stated: "[B]y leaving the scene of the accident, the fleeing driver
deprives the nonfleeing driver of his or her right to have responsibility
for the accident adjudicated in an orderly way according to the rules of
law."8 The cost of being involved in an accident can be extremely high.
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
estimated economic loss resulting from accidents in 2010 was over $242
billion.9 There are hospital bills, lost wages, diminished working
capacity, legal costs, and much more.10 This burden is now borne by
every law abiding citizen in the form of higher insurance premiums."l
Recognizing the inherent wrongness of "hit-and-run" drivers, every
state has enacted some form of legislation that criminalizes fleeing from
the scene of an accident. 12 The typical statute is similar to, or based
5. See Elaine Aradillas, Why Are Hit-Run Drivers Fleeing? Law Enforcement and Safety
Experts Say It's Not Clear, but Many Think FearIs a Factor, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2006, at
Al ("They think that if they hit someone, they are automatically going to prison, he said. But if it's
an accident-if you are not at fault in the crash-you are not going to be charged with a person's
death.").
6. See Joel Kaplan, Hit-Run Drivers Are Hiding Something Panic Fuels Flight from
Accidents, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1996, at 1 (quoting James Fox, dean of the criminal justice college
at Northeastern University, who claims that many hit-and-run drivers are probably driving without
licenses or are wanted for other crimes).
7. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 72-73 (Cal. 1995).
8. Id.
9. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812
013, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED) 1,2,

235-40 (2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pubs/812013.pdf (estimating the economic costs of
automobile accidents in the United States during the year 2010 at nearly $242 billion).
10. See id (examining the monumental economic effects of accidents including hospital bills,
quality of life loss, state costs, property damage, legal costs, emergency services costs, and more).
The report estimates an economic loss of $242 billion in 2010 alone. Id.at 5. For a helpful summary
and breakdown of NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, see Cost of Auto
Crashes & Statistics, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INS. INFO. ASS'N, http://www.rmiia.org/auto/traffic
safety/Cost of crashes.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
11. See Carbajal,899 P.2d at 73 ("The cost of a 'hit and run' violation is paid for by every
law-abiding driver in the form of increased insurance premiums."); Cost of Auto Crashes &
Statistics,supra note 10.
12. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE:
RULES OF THE ROAD WITH STATUTORY ANNOTATIONS 24, 40 (1967) (listing a majority of the
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upon, the Uniform Vehicle Code ("UVC"), which was first written in
1926 in an effort to standardize motor vehicle laws. 3 The typical statue
provides that it is a misdemeanor to leave the scene of an accident that
results in property damage and that it is a felony to flee from the scene
of an accident resulting in personal injury or death.14 These statutes also
require the driver to accurately turn over information such as name,
address, and insurance information."i Most statutes also require the
driver involved in an accident resulting in personal injury to render
reasonable assistance to the injured victim by summoning emergency
help or by transporting the victim to a medical facility.16 Section 600
of the N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") differs from most
other states' hit-and-run statutes, and that is what this Note proposes
to change.17
This Note begins by briefly examining the legal development of
section 600, including the mens rea requirement and constitutional
challenge faced by almost every state's hit-and-run statute."a It then
expands on the deficiencies of the current statute.19 Finally, this Note
proposes three amendments to section 600. First, New York should join
almost every other state and require the driver involved in an accident
that results in injury to provide reasonable assistance to the injured
party."a The second proposed amendment is a "housekeeping" matter
that provides clearer legislative intent: to separate the personal injury
section from the property damage section.2 1 Third, New York should
learn from the Illinois statute and amend its own statute to provide a
short, partial amnesty period where panicked drivers may self-report and
have the crime mitigated from a felony to a misdemeanor charge. 2

citations for states' hit-and-run statutes).
13. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20003 (West 2008); see Carl Warner, A Short History of
Highway and Vehicle Regulations, VOLUNTARYIST.cOM, http://voluntaryist.com/articles/092.html#.
VpZWtRUrKhc (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
14. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20003. Section 20002 makes it a misdemeanor to
leave the scene of an accident where property was damaged. Id. § 20002. Section 20003 makes it a
felony where a person was injured or killed. Id § 20003.
15. Id.§§ 20001-20003.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part IlI.
20. See infra Part W.A.
21. See infra Part V.B.
22. See infra Part V.C.
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LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 600 OF THE NEW YORK
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW

This Part provides a short overview of the legal development of
section 600 of the VTL. Specifically, it focuses on the major legal
challenge to the law's general validity, which seemingly violates the
Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination.2 3 Since section 600
is a criminal statute, some level of a culpable state of mind must exist.
This Part also examines the requisite mens rea required for a violation of
section 600.24
A.

Mens Rea

Focusing on the personal injury provision, section 600 reads as
follows: "[A]ny person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or
having cause to know that personal injury has been caused to another
person, due to an incident involving the motor vehicle operated by such
person shall, before leaving the place where the said personal injury
occurred ..... " The statute goes on to describe the driver's obligations.25
While there is clearly a requirement of "knowledge," the interesting
question that the courts grapple with is, on which specific part of the
statute does the knowledge requirement affect? Does "knowledge" refer
to knowledge of the accident, knowledge of the injury, or knowledge of
the actual fleeing?2 6
The court, in People v. Toussaint,2" explained that although section
600(2) requires proof the defendant knew or had cause to know "that a
personal injury has been caused by his culpability or by accident," the
statute "does not require the People to establish that the defendant acted
with any culpable mental state as to the element of leaving the scene of
the accident. '28 Therefore, in People v. Castanheira,29 despite the
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011).
26. See Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Showing, in Criminal
Prosecution Under "Hit-And-Run " Statute, Accused's Knowledge ofAccident, Injury, Or Damage,
26 A.L.R.5th 1,28, 32-33, 40-41 (1998).
27. 837 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 2007).
28. See id at 219-20; see also People v. Useo, 549 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (App. Div. 1989)
(upholding the conviction of a defendant, under section 600 of the VTL, where the defendant
claimed a lack of mens rea). In Useo, the court also noted:
[T]he statutory provision omits any word or phrase requiring that the defendant act with
a culpable state of mind with respect to the element of leaving the scene of the accident.
The statutory language addressing the defendant's mental state is set off from the
language pertaining to the element of leaving the scene of the accident by commas. The
Legislature's use of punctuation evidences an intent to limit the scienter requirement to
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testimony of the defendant's expert witness, a psychologist, that the
defendant had no memory of the accident, which injured a pedestrian
bystander, the court held the defendant liable under section 600.30 The
psychologist testified that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder and was taking medication that caused short-term
memory loss and consequently had absolutely no memory of the
incident.3 The court held that because "the culpable mental state
of 'knowingly' does not apply to the element of 'leaving the scene of
the incident"' and the credible evidence showed that the defendant
must have known an accident occurred,32 the defendant was guilty under
section 600. 33
Interestingly, while a mens rea of "knowledge" is required as to the
accident and injury, actual knowledge need not be proved conclusively.3 4
Rather, the prosecution must merely show that the defendant should
have reasonably been aware of the accident and injury.35 The courts will
take into account surrounding circumstances which intimate knowledge
by the defendant, such as damage to the defendant's car or the reaction
of the bystanders.3 6 For example, although the defendant in People v.
Kohler37 claimed that he thought he had hit a pothole and had no
knowledge that he had injured a pedestrian, the court, looking at all the

mere knowledge by a defendant as the operator of a motor vehicle that a personal injury
has been caused by his culpability or by accident.
Id.
29. 842 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Crim. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 875 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. Term 2008).
30. Id. at291.
31. Id.at 290.
32. See id. at 292 ("The impact of the collision as described by eye witnesses, both on foot
and in a stationary vehicle, was the 'sound of thunder' and with such force to propel the pedestrian
into the air, landing in the middle of the road or 'double line' of the two direction roadway.").
33. Id.
34. See People v. Kohler, 926 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (App. Div. 2011).
35. Id.
36. See id. (upholding a sentence upon a conviction under section 600 of the VTL where the
defendant claimed lack of knowledge of the accident). The court also noted the following:
Given the circumstances of the accident, the damage to the defendant's car, and the
immediate response by bystanders to block traffic and assist the decedent, while the
defendant was still in proximity to the scene, the evidence established that the defendant
knew or had cause to know that he had caused personal injury to another person. The
evidence did not support the defendant's allegation that he thought he had hit a bird or a
pothole.
Id.; see also People v. Spiegelman, 240 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1963) ("Upon the facts in this
record, it does not appear that the defendant knew that an injury had been caused or that he had left
the place of the accident without stopping.").
37. 926N.Y.S.2dat 161.
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or constructive

B. Constitutionality
There are two primary cases in which the N.Y. Court of Appeals
examined the constitutionality of section 600 of the VTL. The second
case, in particular, represents a major shift in the way the court and
society view motor vehicles.39 In People v. Rosenheimer,4 ° the defendant
was charged under the predecessor statute of section 60041 for fleeing the
scene of a fatal accident without identifying himself first. 42 The
defendant argued the statute violated his Fifth Amendment rights, as he
was forced to provide information that the prosecution would use against
him in the criminal proceedings.4 3 The court upheld the statute, which
required the driver involved in an accident to remain at the scene and
self-report, predicated on the reasoning that in "operating a motor
vehicle the operator exercises a privilege which might be denied him,
and not a right."44 Consequently, the legislature may prescribe on what
conditions this privilege shall be exercised.45 And, since the legislature
may, if they so choose, ban the use of automobiles as they are so
dangerous,46 they can definitely prescribe restrictions of their use, such
as requiring drivers to remain at the scene of an accident and assist the
authorities in reconstructing the events that led to the incident.4 7

38. Id.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
40. 102 N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1913).
41. Id. at 531. The court provided:
Any person operating a motor vehicle, who, knowing that injury has been caused to a
person or property, due to the culpability of the said operator, or to accident, leaves the
place of said injury or accident, without stopping and giving his name, residence,
including street and street number, and operator's license number to the injured party, or
to a police officer, or in case no police officer is in the vicinity of the place of said injury
or accident, then reporting the same to the nearest police station, or judicial officer, shall
be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Id. (quoting High. Law § 290, 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 374, at 673, 684-88 (repealed 1983)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 532 ("The fatalities caused by [automobiles] are so numerous as to permit the
Legislature, if it deemed it wise, to wholly forbid their use.").
47. Id. at 533.
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The court explained in People v. Samuel,4 8 however, that driving an
automobile is an absolute right and cannot be limited solely on the
grounds that driving is a privilege. 9 Section 600 was ultimately upheld
on grounds similar to Rosenheimer of automobiles being considered
dangerous instrumentalities.5" The court reasoned that because motor
vehicles have caused nearly as many deaths as all other categories
of accidents combined, they are very dangerous.51 Furthermore, in
order for the government to fashion responsive safety laws, it is
imperative that there be accurate statistics as to the occurrence of
accidents and their causes. 2 Consequently, based on this analysis,
leaving the scene is a true and substantial independent wrong meriting
treatment as a separate criminal offense, unless barred by an overriding
constitutional limitation.53
Another method of reasoning the courts have employed is similar to
that of the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Byers.54 The court
explained that a statute will only run afoul of the Fifth Amendment if the
primary purpose and effect of the statute is to force self-incrimination.55
The N.Y. statute, however, does not target a specific group of criminal
activity or behavior.5 6 Section 600 merely requires all drivers, whether
involved in criminal activity or not, to stop and remain at the scene of
57
an accident in order to relay accurate information to the authorities.
Since it does not target specific illegal activity, the provision that
requires the driver to technically self-report is not a violation of the
Fifth Amendment.58
III.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE

NEW YORK STATUTE

Section 600 of the VTL is deficient in at least three regards.59 First,
the statute does not place an affirmative duty on the driver involved in a
motor vehicle accident to aid the injured victim in any manner.60 Second,
the property damage section (misdemeanor) is separated from the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

277 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1971).
Id. 382-85.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 385.
402 U.S. 424 (1971).
Samuel, 277 N.E.2d at 385.
Id.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011).

58.
59.

Samuel, 277 N.E.2d at 385.
See infra Part ILI.A-C.

60. N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 600.
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personal injury section (felony) only by a subsection,6 1 which can
frustrate legislative intent and create confusion when a court cites to the
statute.62 Third, the statute criminalizes the fleeing from the scene of an
accident even where the initial contact was not a crime. 63 However, the
statute provides no relief for individuals that panic and flee the scene,
even if they immediately come to their senses and wish to turn
64
themselves in to the police.

A.

Section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law Places No Affirmative
Duty on a Driverto Aid an Injured Victim

Under current N.Y. law, there can be a situation where a driver gets
into an accident and does not flee, yet does nothing to assist the injured
victim, and can be completely free and clear legally.65 This situation is
unconscionable.66 Take, for example, the case of Aguilar v. State,6 7
where the driver of a car involved in an accident remained at the scene
until the authorities arrived, however, did at no point attempt to assist or
even summon assistance for the victim in the other car, who ultimately
needed the fire department to rescue him with the jaws of life and cut
him from his vehicle.68 Pursuant to N.Y. law, this driver would face no

61. See Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 49, 2005 N.Y. Laws 153 (codified as amended at N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 600) (adding these subsections to separate the property damage from the personal
injury and death provisions).
62. See infra Part l.B.
63. See Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[S]ince the
New York hit-and-run statute makes no distinction between negligent and non-negligent drivers and
requires both to identify themselves and report the accident to the police."); Samuel, 277 N.E.2d at
38; People v. Petterson, 477 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 1984).
64. See Oberoi v. Dennison, No. 2007-0996, 2008 WL 733683, at *1, *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 28, 2008) (denying parole for a woman who received a sentence of six to nine years even
though she turned herself in stating that "[t]hey know and understand that I deserve punishment in
this matter. A punishment that I have accepted, and when in Court, I accepted full responsibility for
my conduct. I turned myself in to the authorities once I recovered from my initial panic").
65. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600; see also NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIc LAWS &
ORDiNANCES, supra note 12, at 45 (noting how the N.Y. statute "does not expressly require drivers
to assist persons injured in an accident").
66. See Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 432 (1998).
Commentators have advocated for stricter "duty to assist" laws in the United States:
In the absence of... obligations, it is undou~tedly the moral duty of every person to
extend to others assistance when in danger,... and, if such efforts should be omitted by
any one when they could be made without imperiling his own life, he would, by his
conduct, draw upon himself the just censure and reproach of good [people]; but this is
the only punishment to which he would be subjected by society.
Id.
67. 202 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App. 2006).
68. Id. at 838-39.
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penalty; meanwhile, the victim was not only suffering from excruciating
pain being trapped in a mangled vehicle but also could have potentially
incurred more serious injuries.6 9
Many studies have been conducted that prove a positive effect on
the survival rate of trauma victims in relation to the quickness in which
they receive medical attention, and it is therefore imperative that the
victim receive immediate medical care.7" Forty-five states do, in fact,
impose a duty on a driver involved in an accident that results in injury to
provide assistance to the victim.71 Section 10-104 of the UVC imposes a
duty on the driver to do the following:
[R]ender to any person injured in [an] accident reasonable assistance,
including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying
of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical
is necessary or if such
treatment if it is apparent that such treatment
72
assistance is requested by the injured person.
Twenty-three states simply adopted this language directly from the
UVC. 73 Furthermore, the majority of remaining states have adopted
provisions substantially similar.74 In contrast, New York imposes no
duties on the driver other than the duty to remain at the scene and
provide accurate information to the authorities.7 5
Another consequence of any lack of affirmative duty on the driver
to assist the victim is the nonexistence of monetary recovery by the
victim through a civil suit.76 Under New York's current "hit-and-run"

69. Id.
70. See Muiris Houston, Quick Reaction by Emergency Services Can Mean Difference
Between Life and Death, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014) http://www.irishtimes.com/news/
(documenting some of
health/reaction-time-can-be-difference-between-life-and-death-1.1728488
such studies).
71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4202 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.580
(West 2007); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:100 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-26-1 (West 2012); see
NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40 (stating that
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and New York are the only states that do not

expressly require the driver involved in an accident resulting in injury to assist the victim).
72. See UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 10-104 (NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAF. LAWS & ORD.
2000).
73.

See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40.

74. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 2008) ("The driver also shall render to any
person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements
for transporting, any injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical
treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if that transportation is requested by any
injured person."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4202; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.580; LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:100; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-26-1.
75.

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011).

76.

See Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 188, 190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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statute, a violation of section 600 of the VTL will not support a civil suit
for damages by the victim or his family.77 Even if a driver flees the scene
of an accident leaving the victim wanting of essential medical care,
neither the victim nor the family have a right to sue for the damages that
may have ensued after the accident occurred.7 8
As noted above, forty-five states do place an affirmative duty on the
driver to provide reasonable assistance to the injured victim-in many of
these states a violation of their hit-and-run statutes creates civil
liability.79 As the court in Powell v. Doe8" explains, although fleeing
does not conclusively prove that the driver was negligent in causing the
accident, it may operate as negligence per se.8 Courts in other states
agree, too, that failure to stop and render aid in violation of a statute
that requires such aid constitutes negligence as a matter of law and
will therefore support a civil action by the victim or victim's family in
certain instances.8 2
Creating an affirmative duty on the driver to reasonably assist the
victim will also have the net effect of creating a new right of action by
the victim to sue for damages from a fleeing driver.83 Because, if the
driver flees, he will now be violating a statute and this violation would
support a civil suit under negligence per se.84

77. See id. at 191 ("While a violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor, it contains no
language creating any cause of action on behalf of the injured party and certainly not on behalf of
his relatives.").
78. Id.
79. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 409 n.10 (9th ed. 1994)
(stating that in a number of jurisdictions, hit-and-run statutes have been held to mean that a driver
involved in an accident who fails to give aid may be liable for negligence per se); see also Powell v.
Doe, 473 S.E.2d 407, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting first that a violation of the N.C. statute
would support a claim under negligence per se and that "[the court's] review reveals that a
persuasive number of jurisdictions employ duty to aid statutes as a means of establishing negligence
per se").
80. 473 S.E.2d 407.
81. Id.at413.
82. See Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802, 806-07 (Cal. 1953)
(upholding the jury charge that the fleeing of the defendant may be used to show consciousness of
guilt and noting how "it has been held in other jurisdictions in negligence cases that failure to stop
and render aid is some evidence of a consciousness of responsibility for an accident"); Hallman v.
Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498, 501 (S.C. 1941) (charging the jury "that if the evidence did show a
violation [under the hit and run statute] the same would be competent upon the question of whether
or not the motor truck was being operated in a willful and wanton manner").
83. See Elliott v. City of New York, 747 N.E.2d 760, 762 (N.Y. 2001) ("As a rule, violation
of a State statute that imposes a specific duty constitutes negligence per se, or may even create
absolute liability.").
84. Id.
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B.

The Legislative Intent Behind Section 600 of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law Is Either Unclear or Inadequate
Under the Current Constructionof the Statute

Section 600 of the VTL came into its current form in 1959 and
has remained largely unchanged since then.8" In 2005, subsections
for personal injury and property damage were added.86 However, New
York remains one of the only states that does not have two separate
statutes for property and injury.8 7 This lack of separation can create
some confusion.88
Under the current state of the law, a N.Y. court essentially has two
goals of the legislature to cite as the reasoning behind section 600.89
The first reason has been explained by the N.Y. Court of Appeals in
People v. Samuel,9" in defense of the very constitutionality of the statute
in the face of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. 91 The
court explained that since motor vehicle accidents have caused so many
deaths in the United States, it is imperative that the government gather
accurate statistics regarding motor vehicle accidents. 92 Keeping accurate
statistics as to the cause of accidents and circumstances are essential to
assisting the government fashion better laws. 93 Therefore, requiring
drivers to remain at the scene of an accident and accurately report
essential information is a valid use of police power. 94 While the court
does voice concern for the possible injured victim, it is a side point and
merely dicta. 95
The second and much-quoted reason for section 600 is to ensure
that drivers do not escape from civil or criminal liability that may arise
from their involvement in the accident. 96 As the court in People v.
85. See S. 2043, 1959 Leg., 182nd Sess., 1959 N.Y. Laws ch. 775, at 1855.
86. See S. 4584, 2005 Leg., 228th Sess., 2005 N.Y. Laws ch. 49, at 153, 153-54.
87. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 34, 40
(documenting how most of the other states hit-and-run codes are verbatim or substantially similar to
the UVC which has a separate statute for property damage and personal injury).
88. See infra note 103.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
90. 277 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1971).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
92. Samuel, 277 N.E.2d at 381.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 384-86 (explaining how since this reporting statute does not target criminal behavior
as most accidents do not involve any criminal prosecution, even for the minority that do, requiring
accurate reporting is not a violation of the right not to self-incriminate).
95. See id. at 384-86 ("There are, of course, other reasons why an operator should remain at
the scene of an accident, not the least of which is to provide succor to injured persons." (emphasis
added)).
96. See, e.g., People v. Lindsly, 472 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (App. Div. 1984); People v. Marotti,
862 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (App. Term 2008); People v. Santangelo, 512 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct.
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Lindsly97 succinctly stated, "[t]he primary purpose of section 600 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law is to prevent the evasion of civil liability by a
motorist who may be liable for negligently causing damage by his
leaving the scene of the accident."98 By fleeing the scene, the driver
deprives the victim of having his injury resolved in an orderly way
through the court system.99
While preventing evasion of civil or criminal liability seems like a
valid reason to criminalize fleeing from an accident that results in
property damage, it appears wholly insufficient to support a felony
conviction. 00 Furthermore, this reasoning completely ignores the human
element of an injured victim who potentially is in great need of prompt
medical assistance. 0 1 Yet, under the current law, courts are left to rely
solely upon this reasoning insupport of their holdings.102
Since there is fundamentally only one legislative intent for section
600, courts often cite to it generally-whether referring to the provision
on personal injury or property damage. 103 This may have been fine when
there existed only one operative legislative intent of ensuring that drivers
take responsibility for their actions; but, under the proposed amendment
there would be an affirmative duty on drivers to reasonably assist injured
victims and, consequently, a new legislative intent of ensuring that
1986).
97. 472N.Y.S.2d 115.
98. See id.
at ll7.
99. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1995).
100. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 2007) (defining failure to report sexual
battery as a misdemeanor of the first degree); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1993) (defining failure
to report a crime in progress as a petty misdemeanor); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(1) (West
2006) (stating that a failure to report certain felonies is punishable as a misdemeanor); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 2003) (defining failure to report violent crime or sexual crime or
assault against a child as a gross misdemeanor); cf Ken Levy, Killing,Letting Die, and the Case for
Mildly PunishingBad Samaritanism, 44 GA.L. REV. 607, 619-20 n.26 (2010) (explaining how all
the states that do punish "bad samaritanism" do so with misdemeanor charges only).
101. See Bailey v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 436, 441 (Ct. App. 1970) ("The purpose and
propriety of this portion of the statute are apparent. It was enacted for the protection of persons
injured in an accident, and was designed to prohibit drivers, under pain of punishment, from leaving
such persons in distress and danger for want of proper medical or surgical treatment.").
102. See, e.g., People v. Santangelo, 512 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("The purpose of
VTL § 600 is to prohibit motorists involved in accidents from seeking to evade the civil or criminal
consequences of their actions by fleeing before their identity can be established." (citations
omitted)). In Santangelo, the pedestrian victim ultimately died, yet the court only cited to the
legislative intent of evasion of liability. See id
103. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 732 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (App. Div. 2001) (charging only
"vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and leaving the scene of an incident without
reporting"); People v. King, 325 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (Cty. Ct. 1971) ("After a jury trial at which he
was represented by counsel, defendant was found guilty of Criminally Negligent Homicide (Section
125.10, Penal Law), and Leaving Scene of Accident Without Reporting (Section 600, Vehicle and
Traffic Law)."); see People v. Wenceslao, 329 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392-94 (Crim. Ct. 1972).
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injured victims receive prompt medical care. 10 4 Therefore, it becomes
important that the courts cite more accurately to the specific violation
and not just to section 600.1°5 This would be made much simpler if New
York would follow the example of the UVC and the majority of other
and
states, which split property damage and personal injury into separate
10 6
statute.
same
the
of
subsections
distinct statutes-not merely
C. The CurrentStatute ProvidesNo Relief or Second Chancefor a
Driver Whose Only Crime Was to Panic and Flee
This Subpart explains how under the current N.Y. law, once a
driver violates section 600 of the VTL by leaving the scene of an
accident, there is no second chance.107 Even if the driver were to almost
immediately seek to return to the scene of the accident and aid the
victim, he would find himself charged under section 600 and potentially
facing substantial prison time.10 s This is unlike Illinois's statute,
which provides a half hour of partial amnesty for the driver to return
or self-report. 10 9
A prime example of this is the case of Mr. Dante Altieri, a
nineteen-year-old man from Liverpool, New York. 10 Dante was a great
student and had a perfect driving record, but he made one big mistake.
On September 28, 2014, Dante struck and killed Joseph Roderka. Dante
panicked and fled."1' Immediately after arriving home, Dante confided in
104. See People v. Mace, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 509-10 (Ct. App. 2011) ("These are but
humanitarian acts required to be performed by all drivers of vehicles involved in accidents causing
injuries, whether or not they are responsible for the accident."); see also Powell v. Doe, 473 S.E.2d
407, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he general purpose of § 20-166 is to 'facilitate investigation of
automobile accidents and to assure immediate aid to anyone injured by such collision."' (quoting
State v. Fearing, 269 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1980), aff'd in part,rev'd inpart,284 S.E.2d 487 (1981))).
105. See supra Part IIB.
106. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40 (noting
that twenty-three states have adopted verbatim the language of the UVC, which has separate statutes
for personal injury and property damage); see also CAL.VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20004 (West 2008);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 §§ 4201-4202 (West 2008).
107. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011); see also Kathleen Culliton,
Woman Turns Self in for Hit-And-Run after Seeing Story on TV, N.Y. POST (Oct. 30,
2015), http://nypost.com/2015/10/30/woman-tums-self-in-for-hit-and-run-after-seeing-story-on-tv
(discussing how a woman turned herself in and was charged under section 600 of the N.Y. VTL).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
109. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401 (2014).
110. See Douglas Dowty, Panicked Driver Left Fatal Hit-and-Run in Clay to Tell Parents;
Judge Calls Evidence of Guilt Strong, SYRACUSE (May 8, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.syracuse.
comnews/index.ssf/2014/05/panicked driver left fatal hit-and-rm in claytotellparents_
judge calls evide.html.
111. See Douglas Dowry, Young Driver in FatalClay Hit-And-Run Avoids Jail Time Despite
Plea from Victim's Family, SYRACUSE (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2014/08/youngdriver in fatal clayhit-andrun avoidsjail time despiteplea_
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his parents, and they all headed back to the scene of the incident.112
Though they arrived less than a half hour after the accident occurred, it
was too late. Dante violated section 600, was arrested, and faced a class
13
E felony charge.'
Had this accident occurred in Illinois, the fact that Dante returned to
the scene in under a half hour would have mitigated the charge he would
likely be facing.1 14 The Illinois statute, understanding the frailty of the
human mind, provides that a person who fled may return within a half
hour and have his or her crime severely diminished.115 A driver who
flees the scene of a fatal accident is charged with a class 1 felony,
whereas a driver who returns within a half hour is only charged with a
class 4 felony. 1 6 As the court in People v. Young1 17 explains:
The statute's purpose is to inform those who have been injured or
damaged by a hit-and-run driver of the driver's identity. This is
accomplished by encouraging such drivers to take advantage of a
second chance to come forward and reveal their identity. Those who
18
do come forward will not be prosecuted for a felony. 1
In New York, a driver that flees from the scene of an accident
actually has an incentive to not return. 1 9 If the driver returns in a timely
manner, all he can hope for is prosecutorial discretion and perhaps a
favorable sentence from the judge. 2 ' The driver is still very likely to get
dragged through the lengthy, stressful, and expensive court process.12'
from victim.html.
112. Id.
113. Dowty, supranote 110.
114. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401 ("Any person who has failed to stop or to comply
with the requirements of paragraph (a) shall, as soon as possible but in no case later than one-half
hour after such motor vehicle accident.").
115. See Cesena v. Du Page Cty., 582 N.E.2d 177, 180-81 (111. 1991) ("Pursuant to the
reporting statute, the legislature has provided the driver who violates the hit-and-run statute with
a... grace period during which he may make an accident report and thereby avoid felony
prosecution pursuant to the reporting statute.").
116. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401(c)-(d).
117. 441 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 1982).
118. Id. at 643.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
120. See Dowty, supra note 111.
121. See Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper
and Frye: Is the Supreme Court Making the Ordinary CriminalProcess "Too Long, Too Expensive,
and Unpredictable... in Pursuit of Perfect Justice"?, 51 DUQ. L. REv. 735, 735 (2013) (arguing
for changes to the criminal justice system). The changes commentators have urged can be summed
as follows:
"'[T]oo long, too expensive, and unpredictable." That is how Justice Scalia
described "the ordinary criminal process" in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia blamed the length, cost, and unpredictability
of criminal proceedings not on the intrinsic nature of adjudication but on the
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Statistically, however, most hit-and-run drivers are never caught, and
this provides a great incentive for the driver to not self-report and
roll the dice on getting apprehended,123 tried, and convicted. 122 This
disincentive has multiple societal costs.
First, there are the investigation costs. 124 Investigations are costly
and time consuming, as police are forced to chase down partial leads and
inaccurate information.1 25 Second, there is the economic effect that
results from the accident and possible injury. 126 There are hospital bills,
lost wages, and emotional distress to the victim and family. 2 7 This only
gets exacerbated when there is no defendant and seemingly no one
responsible.12 8 Furthermore, where there is no culpable driver, there is
no one's insurance to pay for the damages, and thus, this cost is borne by
the rest of society in the form of higher insurance premiums. 129 It would
seem wise to incentivize, rather than disincentivize, a driver to return
and self-report. 3 °

constitutional jurisprudence underlying the criminal process, which he depicted as
unnecessarily intricate and unduly burdensome.
Id. at 735 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1391 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
122. See Meredith Cohn, Hit-and-Run Drivers Not Uncommon, but Not Well Understood,
BALT. SUN (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-hit-and-ni-20150205-story.
html ("It may be tough to research because many hit-and-run drivers are never caught."); Mario
Koran, If You Hit Someone with a Car and Drive Away, You're Probably Not Getting Punished,
VOICE SAN DIEGO (Aug. 8, 2014, 5:46 PM), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/hit-and-runs/if-youhit-someone-with-a-car-and-drive-away-youre-probably-not-getting-punished ("San Diego drivers
who kill or injure someone with their car and just keep driving evade punishment almost nine out of
10 times."); Yang Wang, More Than 50% Of Drivers Get Away with Hit-And-Runs, CHRON (Apr.
13, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/More-than-50-of-driversget-away-with-1707226.php.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 124-29.
124. See infra note 125.
125. See, e.g., Prince of Petworth, How Hard Is It to Track Down a Hit and Run Driver?,
POPVILLE: DC's NEIGHBORHOOD BLOG (June 28, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.popville.com/
2010/06/how-hard-is-it-to-track-down-a-hit-and-run-driver (complaining how even though a
witness got part of the suspect's license plate number, the police were still unable to track down the
suspect); see also Koran, supranote 122.
126. See supra notes 9-10.
127. See supra notes 9-10; see also Carolina Leid, Family of Young Woman Killed Pleadsfor
Hit-And-Run Driver to Turn Self In, EYEWITNESS NEWS ABC7 (Sept. 9, 2015), http://abc7ny.
976
610
com/news/family-of-young-woman-killed-pleads-for-hit-and-run-driver-to-turn-self-in/
("My family is hurting right now, can you please return yourself?").
128. See id.
129. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 73 (Cal. 1995) ("The cost of a 'hit and run' violation
is paid for by every law-abiding driver in the form of increased insurance premiums.").
130. See supra Part HI.C.
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NEW YORK SHOULD IMPOSE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY ON A DRIVER
INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT TO ASSIST THE VICTIM IN ANY
REASONABLE WAY

This Part proposes that New York amend the current hit-and-run
statute, section 600 of the VTL, 131 to include an affirmative duty on the
driver involved in an accident, which results in personal injury to a
pedestrian or other driver, to reasonably assist the victim in any way
possible. 132 This Part then defines the parameters of the duty to assist, as
well as analyzes the proper punishment for violating this duty, primarily
using the UVC and the California Vehicle Code as models. 133 This Part
then further explores the benefit of a new cause of civil action under the
negligence per se theory if a driver were to flee in violation of the
134
affirmative duty to assist.
A.

The ProposedDuty to Assist

This proposed amendment would require any driver involved in a
motor vehicle accident that results in serious bodily injury to not only
remain at the scene and accurately turn over information to the police
but to actually assist the injured victim.'35 This provision is already in
effect in some form in forty-five states. 13 6 The majority of those states
simply adopted the language of section 10-104 of the UVC. 137 Many
other states adopted their own statute criminalizing hit-and-runs, which

131. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2005).
132. See infra Part N.A.
133. See infra Part IV.A.2.
134. See infra Part IV.A.3.
135. See infra Part IV.A.
136. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40 (stating
that Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, and New York are the only states that do not
expressly require the driver involved in an accident resulting in injury to assist the victim); see also
infra notes 137-38.
137. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 38, 40. The
Code notes that twenty-three states have adopted verbatim the language of the UVC, section 10104(a), which states as follows:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death ... shall
give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving... and
shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the
carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician,
surgeon or hospital for medical treatment if it is that such treatment is necessary or if
such assistance is requested by the injured person.
Id. at 38.
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include an affirmative duty on the driver to assist.138 The amendment to
section 600 of the VTL would read as follows:
Personal injury. (a) Any person operating a motor vehicle who,
knowing or having cause to know that personal injury has been caused
to another person, due to an incident involving the motor vehicle
operated by such person shall, before leaving the place where the said
personal injury occurred, stop, and render reasonable assistance to
any person injured in the accident, exhibit his or her license and
insurance identification card for such vehicle, when such card is
required pursuant to articles six and eight of this chapter, and give
his or her name, residence, including street and street number,
insurance carrier and insurance identification information including but
not limited to the number and effective dates of said individual's
insurance policy and license number, to the injured party, if practical,
and also to a police officer, or in the event that no police officer is in
the vicinity of the place of said injury, then, he or she shall report said
incident as soon as physically able to the nearest police station or
139
judicial officer.

1. Violating This New Duty Will Act as a Standalone Reason to
Support a Conviction Under Section 600 of the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law
This Subpart explains what penalty would be imposed on a driver
who fails to reasonably assist the victim. 4 ° Under the current N.Y.
statute, the punishment for violating section 600 of the VTL depends on
whether the victim is injured, seriously injured, or dies.141 If the victim is
injured, then the charge is a class A misdemeanor;14 2 if the victim is

138. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 2008) ("[T]he driver also shall render to any
person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements
for transporting, any injured person to a physician."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 4202 (West 2008)
("[The driver] shall render to any person injured in such collision reasonable assistance, including
the carrying of such person to a hospital or physician."); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-166 (West
2008) ("[The driver] shall render to any person injured in such crash reasonable assistance,
including the calling for medical assistance if it is apparent that such assistance is necessary or is
requested by the injured person.").
139. The term "reasonable" has survived attacks in multiple states for unconstitutional
vagueness. State v. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 208 P.3d 408, 413 (Mont. 2009) (explaining how
reasonable assistance as used in the Montana hit-and-run statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-7-103
(2015), is not unconstitutionally vague); see People v. Thompson, 242 N.W. 857, 860 (Mich. 1932)
("[I]n connection with the context and subject-matter of this statute, the expressions above quoted in
the instant case have such a fixed and well-understood meaning as not to render section 30 of the act
invalid.").
140. See infra Part IV.A..
141. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011).
142. Id. § 600 2(c).
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seriously injured, the charge is a class E felony; 143 and if the victim is
deceased, then the charge is a class D felony.1" To be convicted of the
class D felony charge in New York, the state must show as follows:
1. That on or about (date), in the county of (County), the defendant,
(defendant's name), operated a motor vehicle;
2. That at that time and place, the defendant knew or had cause
to know that personal injury had been caused to another person,
due to an incident involving the motor vehicle operated by
the defendant;
3. That the defendant did not, before leaving the place where the
personal injury occurred, stop, and, in the event that no police
officer was in the vicinity of the place of the injury, report the
incident as soon as physically able to the nearest police station or
judicial officer; and
45
4. That the personal injury involved resulted in death. 1
Contrast this to what a jury needs to find in order to convict under
the California statute: prongs one, two, and three are substantially
similar to New York's prongs one and two. However, under prong four,
all the jury must find is that the defendant failed to fulfill any duty
required of him or her under sections 20001 and 20003, one of which is
the failure "[t]o provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in
the accident.' 46 Similarly, under the Illinois statute, the failure to render
aid by itself will support a conviction under that state's felony hit-andrun statute.

47

The consequence of the proposed amendment would be to
criminalize a failure of the driver to provide reasonable assistance to the
injured victim whether the initial accident was the driver's fault or

143.
144.

Id.
Id.

145.

See Leaving Scene of an Incident Without Reporting, NYCOURTs.GOV, http://www.

courts.state.ny.us/judges/cji/3-VTLJVTL_600/VTL-600-2a-death.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2016)
(containing the standard jury charge for a violation of any of the subsections of section 600 of the
VTL after 2005).

146.

MATTHEW BENDER, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

155 (2015), http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrimjuryins.pdf (stating standard jury
charge for a violation of California's hit-and-run statute, CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20003 (West
2008)).
147. See SPECIAL SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, ILL.
SUPREME COURT, INTRODUCTION TO IN CRIMINAL § 23.06 (2016), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/
circuitcourtlCriminalJurylnstructions/CRIM%2023.00.pdf (explaining jury charge for a violation of
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401(a) (2014)).
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not. 48 This means that under the amended statute, even if the driver
remains at the scene, the driver must also provide reasonable assistance
to the victim, and if he fails to do so he can be charged under section 600
of the N.Y. VTL for failing to render aid.149 That is to say, a failure to
provide reasonable assistance to an injured victim will be enough to
support an independent conviction under
the statute-similar to the
150
current law in both Illinois and California.
2. Defining the Scope of the Duty to Assist
This Subpart defines the scope of this new duty on the driver to
reasonably assist the injured victim. The UVC, 151 the states that adopted
the UVC,'52 and the California statute' 53 all include the specific duty on
the driver to transport the victim to a hospital or doctor when
necessary.154 This Note argues that the amended N.Y. statute need not
include this specific duty as it is unnecessary due to the advent of cell
phones and the ease of summoning professional emergency services.'
Furthermore, it is unwise to obligate non-professionals to actively aid
injured persons as they may injure them further. 156 This Note proposes
that the N.Y. duty should be a general one of reasonable assistance, and
the only specific duty on the driver, if any, should be the duty to
summon help on his or her cell phone.'57

148.

See People v. Petterson, 477 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 1984) ("[I]n other words, the

mere occurrence of an injury to another person is sufficient to trigger the statutory provisions,

irrespective of whether the motorist is at fault.").
149.

See supraPart IV.A.1.

150. See supratext accompanying notes 146-47.
151. NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40. The report
further states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death ... shall
give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving... and
shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the
carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician,
surgeon or hospital for medical treatment if it is that such treatment is necessary or if
such assistance is requested by the injured person.
1d.
152. See supra note 137.
153. See supra note 138.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
155. See infra Part IV.A.2.
156. See People v. Limon, 60 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1967) ("[O]f course, the
'reasonable assistance' referred to in the statute might be the summoning of aid. In some cases, it
would be much better for the driver to call for assistance than to attempt immediate ministrations to
the injured person."); Marin Roger Scordato, Understandingthe Absence of a Duty to Reasonably
Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1476-78 (2008).
157. See infra note 183.
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Under the UVC, the duty to assist is general as well as specific."'
The specific example of the duty to assist is the duty to transport the
victim to a hospital or doctor, when such assistance is visibly
necessary. 5 9 Under the California statute, there exists a very similar
duty of "transport[ing], or mak[ing] arrangements for transporting, any
injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if that
transportation is requested by any injured person."' 6 ° The Illinois statute,
being adopted from the UVC, obviously contains the same duty to
161
transport or make arrangements for transport.
However, U.S. law and citizens have long been resistant to placing
affirmative duties on bystanders to assist injured individuals or victims
of crimes. 162 This is unlike many European countries, where there are
laws that require bystanders to assist when the assistance can be done
easily and safely. 163 In the United States, only a small minority of states
have such "mandatory assisting" laws, and even those states only
164
penalize this failure to assist with minor fines.
However, there is a significant difference between the American
laws reluctance to criminalize a bystander's failure to assist and the
failure of a driver involved in an accident.1 65 A bystander did nothing to
create the peril, whereas the driver of the car, even if not directly at fault
for the accident, plays a major role in the injury of the victim as it was
through the driver's actions that the victim is hurt now and in need of

158. See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 40.
159. Id
160. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 2008).
161. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-403 (2014).
162. See Scordato, supra note 156, at 1476 (defending American law's long absence of
requiring bystanders to assist victims in even non dangerous situations); Daniel B. Yeager, Note, A
Radical Community of Aid. A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1-9 (1993) (arguing for stronger laws in more states that require easy rescue and
stating that if the states do not want to impose such duties then they should come up with better
reasons than currently exist).
163. See Yeager, supra note 162, at 6 n.28. See generally Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good,
Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law Analysis, II ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 77 (2005)
(explaining and tracing the cultural differences between the United States, which generally does not
require rescue, and the European countries that do require rescue).
164. See Yeager, supra note 162, at 5-8, 22-24 (examining the states that have such laws and
the minor penalties they carry); see also John T. Pardun, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global
Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMp. L.J. 591, 596-603 (1998) (examining the few American
states that do have "good Samaritan" laws).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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understood this distinction
medical attention.1 66 Most states intuitively
167
and adopted the UVC's duty to assist.
That being said, it may seem impractical to some, maybe even
dangerous, if the state were to impose a duty on drivers involved in
accidents to transport their victims to hospitals as non-professional
assistance can cause more harm to the already injured victim. 168 Such a
requirement might also have the effect of creating civil litigation
regarding the negligent transport by the drivers of their victims.

169

There

is, however, a great technological advancement that perhaps makes the
entire duty to transport moot-cell phones. 7 ' With the prevalence of
cell phones, the ease of summoning help remotely almost obviates the
need for the driver to ever have to physically transport the victim to
the hospital.' 7 '
166. See O'Malley, supra note 1, at 372-73, 376 (1931) (examining the creation of a civil
liability under the Indiana hit-and-run statute of 1929, but first explaining how this new legislative
duty to assist, in spite of U.S. law's general distrust to such duties, "amounts to nothing more than
raising to a legal status a duty which at common law was considered only moral"); see also Jennifer
L. Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What
Is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 353, 367 (1999)
(noting that hit-and-run statutes are a recognized exception to the general rule of no duty to assist in
the United States).
167. See supra notes 136-38. Many courts also emphasize how these laws are necessary as a
humanitarian measure of ensuring that the injured victims receive immediate care. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 436, 441 (Ct. App. 1970) ("[T]hese are but humanitarian acts
required to be performed by all drivers of vehicles involved in accidents causing injuries, whether or
not they are responsible for the accident."); People v. Thompson, 242 N.W. 857, 861 (Mich. 1932)
("[T]hese provisions are, not only humanitarian, but obviously contribute to the mutual welfare and
safety of all users of the highways.").
168. See People v. Limon, 60 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1967) ("[O]f course, the
'reasonable assistance' referred to in the statute might be the summoning of aid. In some cases, it
would be much better for the driver to call for assistance than to attempt immediate ministrations to
the injured person."); see also Scordato, supra note 156, at 1476-78 (arguing against expanding
"good Samaritan" laws in the United States and noting how even the most well intentioned nonprofessional rescuers can often cause more harm than good, as well as quoting many cases where
the courts have noted the damage occurring from non-professional help).
169. See Groninger, supra note 166, at 363-64; Barry W. Szymanski, The Good Samaritan
Statute: Civil Liability Exemptions for Emergency Care, Wis. LAW., July 2007, at 10, 12
(examining Wisconsin's "good Samaritan" statute and explaining that the very purpose of such
statutes is to protect from civil liability those who provide emergency aid even if provided
negligently); Susan Donaldson James, Woman Sued for Rescue Effort in Car Crash, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6498405&page=l (explaining how a
women pulled her friend from a car wreck by repeatedly yanking on her legs causing her to remain
permanently paralyzed).
170. See Jesse A. Cripps, Jr., Dialing While Driving: The Battle over Cell Phone Use on
Americas Roadways, 37 GONZ. L. REv. 89, 91 (2002) (citing a Harvard study that "[a]s of July
2000, over 100 million citizens nationwide used cell phones").
171. See id at 100-01 nn.90-92 (discussing studies conducted by both cell phone
manufacturers and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that show that many drivers
use their cell phones to summon emergency services for accidents they witness and that "[e]very
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The duty to transport the injured accident victim created by the
UVC was first enacted in 1926, which was well before the advent of cell
phones and the ability to summon help remotely. 72 Furthermore, in
1926, there was no help to summon as there was no official ambulance
service until the establishment of the American Red Cross in 1936.173
Ambulance services, as we know them, only came to be in the 1960s,
and this, too, was well before cell phones. 174 However, with the advent
of cell phones and their pervasiveness, it can be assumed that almost
every driver is equipped with a cell phone or at the very least other
drivers or pedestrians are equipped with cell phones. 175 Therefore, the
new duty created by this statutory amendment need not open the
"Pandora's box" of negligent transport, or philosophical discussions
about the rightness or wrongness of creating a significant duty on the
driver to assist and transport the victim. 76 Rather, these issues can be
177
bypassed by simply creating a duty to summon help.
An example of a modem day "duty to assist" statute is North
Carolina's hit-and-run or good Samaritan statute. 78 This statute was
amended in 1982, well after the advent of sophisticated mobile medical
transportation, and does not require that the driver actually transport the
victim.179 Rather, the duty created is that the driver "shall render to any
person injured in such crash reasonable assistance, including the calling

day more than 118,000 emergency calls are made from a wireless phone").
172.

See NAT'L COMM. ON UNIF. TRAFFIC LAWS & ORDINANCES, supra note 12, at 39-40

(explaining that section 10-104---the duty to render assistance and transport the victim if
necessary-first appeared in the original UVC in 1926 and while it did undergo some amendments
it is still substantially similar to the 1926 duty and twenty-three states adopted this provision
verbatim).
173. See VINCENT D. ROBBINS, A HISTORY OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES & MEDICAL
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS INAMERICA 39-40 (2005) ("A significant milestone in the EMS system
development in the United States was reached in 1936. In that year the American Red Cross (ARC)
established nearly 900 dedicated posts, spread along the country's highways, with the purpose of
aiding those involved in motor vehicle accidents."). Even the counties that had private ambulance
services usually sponsored by hospitals or local municipalities, had extremely slow service. See
History of New Orleans EMS, NOLA, http://www.nola.gov/ems/about-us/history (last visited Nov.
26, 2016) (providing that "in 1907 the Ambulance Service answered 1,929 calls with an average
response time of twenty-eight minutes," and that emergency medical services were not taken over
by the government until 1947).
174. See ROBBINS, supranote 173, at 45-48.
175. See Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% ofAdults, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults.
176. See supratext accompanying notes 168-71.
177. See infra note 183.
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166 (2008).
179. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166 (1981) ("[T]he driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident.., shall render to any person injured in such accident.., reasonable assistance, including
the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon ....
").
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for medical assistance if it is apparent' that such assistance is necessary
or is requested by the injured person. 180
The amendment to section 600 of the N.Y. VTL as proposed only
includes a general requirement to reasonably assist the victim. 1 ' A
reasonable requirement under this general duty is for the driver to use his
cell phone to summon the proper authorities or stop a bypassing car or
pedestrian and use their cell phone to summon help.' 82 There is rarely a
reason anymore to require the driver to actually physically transport the
victim, and so the statute should just be amended to include this general
duty to reasonably assist, with a specific example being the obligation to
summon emergency services when necessary.' 83
3. Under This Amendment, If a Driver Flees, the Victim Can Sue
for Damages Under the Theory of Negligence Per Se
This Subpart argues, aside from the humanitarian aspect of ensuring
that the victim receive necessary and timely medical attention, this duty
to assist will create a new civil option for the victim.184 A violation of
section 600 currently will not support a private civil suit for damages by
the victim or victim's family.' 85 However, under the proposed
amendment, if the driver of the vehicle leaves the scene without
providing reasonable assistance to the victim in violation of the amended
section 600, there would be a new opportunity for the victim of a
hit-and-run accident to recover damages under the theory of negligence
per se.' 86

180. Id.
181. See supra Part W.A.
182. See People v. Limon, 60 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1967) ("[O]f course, the
'reasonable assistance' referred to in the statute might be the summoning of aid. In some cases, it
would be much better for the driver to call for assistance than to attempt immediate ministrations to
the injured person.").
183. The amendment would read as follows:
Any person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing or having cause to know that
personal injury has been caused to another person, due to an incident involving the
motor vehicle operated by such person shall, before leaving the place where the said
personal injury occurred,stop, and render reasonable assistance to any person injured
in the accident, including the calling for medical assistance if it is apparent that such
assistanceis necessary.

184. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
185. See Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
("While a violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor, it contains no language creating any
cause of action on behalf of the injured party and certainly not on behalf of his relatives.").
186. See WADE ET AL., supra note 79, at 409 n.10 (stating that in a number ofjurisdictions, hitand-run statutes have been held to mean that a driver involved in an accident who fails to give aid
may be liable for negligence per se).
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In many states where the driver does have the duty to reasonably
assist the injured victim the failure to do so will support a civil claim
aside from the criminal charge. 87 For example, a North Carolina court in
Powell v. Doe'88 held that a violation of North Carolina's hit-and-run
statute189 would support a civil suit under the theory of negligence per
se. 19 ° Similarly, a California court in People v. Corners'9' held that a
violation of their state's hit-and-run statute' 9 would support a civil
claim under negligence per se if it could be proved that the victim's
injuries were exacerbated by the lack of immediate care. 193 Furthermore,
some courts have allowed fleeing to evidence consciousness of guilt of
the driver's behavior prior to the accident. 194
In New York, however, at least prior to the proposed amendment,
the courts have refused to allow a private action.' 95 In Campbell v.
Westmoreland Farm,9 6 the district court applying N.Y. law clearly
stated that nothing in New York's hit-and-run statute creates a private
right to sue, thus dismissing the suit brought by a hit-and-run victim's
family. 97 The court noted how "[i]t would be strange if an injured
plaintiff could recover when a culpable motorist left the scene with
knowledge of the injury but could not recover if the same motorist
departed from the scene without such knowledge-although the injury
would be the same in both cases."' 98 If, however, New York were to join
the vast majority of other states and amend section 600 to require the
driver involved in an accident to provide reasonable assistance to the
187. Id.
188. 473 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166 (2008).
190. See Powell v. Doe, 473 S.E.2d 407, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that although
a violation of the statute can support a claim under negligence per se in the instant case there was
no proof that the injuries were exacerbated by the fleeing of the defendant, who was never
apprehended).
191. 221 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App. 1985).
192. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20003 (West 2008).
193. See 221 Cal. Rptr. at 393 ("[Cjommission of the crime gives rise to civil liability for
damages only if the act of leaving the scene proximately causes further injury or death." (emphasis
added)).
194. See Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802, 806-07 (Cal. 1953)
(upholding a jury charge that the fleeing of the defendant may be used to show consciousness of
guilt and noting how "it has been held in other jurisdictions in negligence cases that failure to stop
and render aid is some evidence of a consciousness of responsibility for an accident"); Hallman v.
Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C. 1941) (charging ajury "that if the evidence did show a violation
[of the hit-and-run statute,] the same would be competent upon the question of whether or not the
motor truck was being operated in a willful and wanton manner").
195. See infra text accompanying notes 196-98.
196. 270 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
197. Id. at 191-92.
198. Id. at 191.
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also support a new civil suit
victim, a violation of this statute would then
1 99
flees.
driver
the
after
occur
that
for injuries
B. New York Should Amend Section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
to Separate PropertyDamage and PersonalInjury into Separate
Sections so That There Exists ClearLegislative Intentfor Each

The second amendment this Note proposes is essentially a
housekeeping matter which is necessitated by the previous proposed
amendment.2 00 Currently, under section 600 of the VTL, fleeing the

scene of property damage (a misdemeanor) is separated from fleeing the
scene of an accident resulting in serious injury or death (a felony) by
subsections only.201 As such, many courts simply cite to section 600 in

general without even specifying which subsection the defendant was
2 02
charged or convicted under. This may have been fine when there only

existed one legislative intent for section 600, ensuring that the driver

20 3
take responsibility both criminally and civilly for his actions.

However, under the proposed amendment, New York will add a duty for
the driver involved in an accident to provide reasonable assistance to the
injured victim, and this will create a new legislative intent of ensuring
20 4
that injured victims obtain prompt necessary medical attention.

Consequently, it becomes necessary for New York to split up

"property damage" and "personal injury" into separate sections so that
courts can more easily cite to the specific section and maintain clear
legislative intent.2 0 5
This proposed amendment simply splits the property damage part

of the statute from the personal injury section. This new statute consists
of sections 600-i and 600-ii. This would be similar to almost every other

state's statutes where "property damage" is separated from "personal
injury" in separate sections. 0 6
199. See supra text accompanying notes 186-94.
200. See supra Part W.A.1.
201. See N.Y. VEH. &TRAF. LAW § 600 (McKinney 2011).
202. See, e.g., People v. Santangelo, 512 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1986); People v.
Wenceslao, 329 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (Crim. Ct. 1972); People v. King, 325 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (Cty.
Ct. 1971).
203. See People v. Lindsly, 472 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (App. Div. 1984) ("[T]he primary purpose
of section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is to prevent the evasion of civil liability by a
motorist who may be liable for negligently causing damage by his leaving the scene of the
accident."); see also People v. Marotti, 862 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (App. Term 2008).
204. See supra Part W.A. 1.
205. See supra Part IHI.B.
206. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20004 (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.027,
.061 (West 2014); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401 to -402 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-08-04 to
-05 (2013).
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In California's hit-and-run statute, for example, section 20001 of
the California Vehicle Code criminalizes fleeing from an accident
resulting in serious injury or death, and section 20002 of the California
Vehicle Code criminalizes fleeing from an accident resulting in property
damage. 20 7 Two distinct legislative intents also exist for the two distinct
hit-and-run sections. 20 8 The first legislative intent is to support the
misdemeanor section of fleeing from "property damage" and, similar to
New York's, it is to ensure that the driver takes civil and criminal
responsibility.20 9 The second legislative intent, in support of the felony
section of fleeing from "personal injury," is to ensure that the injured
victim is not left "in distress and danger for want of proper medical or
surgical treatment., 211 Since the sections and their legislative intents are
clearly distinct, California courts easily cite to the specific section and
legislative intent remains very clear.2 11 If New York were to split section
600 into section 600-i (property damage) and section 600-ii (personal
injury), there would be substantially less confusion in court decisions
and, consequently, legislative intent would not be confused.2 12
C. New York Should Provide Some Measure ofRelieffor Drivers Who
Fled Merelyfrom Panic
Current N.Y. law provides that a driver who flees, even if
completely faultless in the original accident, can and likely will be
charged under section 600 of the VTL; and, if convicted, the driver will
face substantial prison time.2" 3 The law provides no relief or second
207. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20001-20002.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
209. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 72-73 (Cal. 1995) ("By leaving the scene of the
accident, the fleeing driver deprives the nonfleeing driver of his or her right to have responsibility
for the accident adjudicated in an orderly way according to the rules of law."); People v. Crouch,
166 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980) ("The regulatory purpose of Vehicle Code,
section 20002, subdivision (a) is to provide the owners of property damaged in traffic accidents with
the information they need to pursue their civil remedies.").
210. See Bailey v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 436, 441 (Ct. App. 1970) ("The purpose and
propriety of this portion of the statute are apparent. It was enacted for the protection of persons
injured in an accident, and was designed to prohibit drivers, under pain of punishment, from leaving
such persons in distress and danger for want of proper medical or surgical treatment."); People v.
Jordan, 29 Cal. Rptr. 619, 620 (Ct. App. 1963) ("[T]he legislative purpose in enacting 20001 was to
prevent the driver of the offending car from leaving the scene of the accident without fumishing the
information as to his identity and without rendering necessary aid to the injured person.").
211. See supra notes 209-10.
212. See supra Part M.B.
213. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600 ("Any violation of the provisions of paragraph a of
this subdivision.., or (ii) results in death shall constitute a class D felony punishable by a fine of
not less than two thousand nor more than five thousand dollars in addition to any other penalties
provided by law."). The other penalties include up to seven years in prison. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
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chance to a driver whose entire crime was that, in a moment of weakness
214
during an intensely stressful situation, he made a mistake and fled.
Even if the driver were to almost immediately come to his senses and
wish to turn himself in to the police he may face severe criminal
repercussions. 2 The example of Dante Altieri is very disturbing, and
his case is not at all unique.21 6 There are many drivers whose only crime
was that they panicked and fled, yet the law does not provide any official
relief other than prosecutorial discretion.21 7
This Note proposes that New York add an amendment similar to
what is currently in force in Illinois, where a driver involved in an
218
accident who flees may return and self-report within a half hour. If the
driver returns within this timeframe, he will not be charged under the
most stringent felony in the statute, rather returning will operate as a
mitigation. 219 This Subpart also explains some of the anticipated social
§ 70.00 (McKinney 2009) ("The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be at least three
years and the term shall be fixed as follows: ...(d) For a class D felony, the term shall be fixed by
the court, and shall not exceed seven years; and (e) For a class E felony, the term shall be fixed by
the court, and shall not exceed four years.").
214. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600. In California, however, the statute provides for judicial
discretion in imposing the sentence for a conviction pursuant to its hit-and-run statute. See CAL.
VEsl. CODE § 20001 (West 2008) (providing judicial discretion to lower the penalty upon
conviction). The statute explains the following:
If the accident described in subdivision (a) results in death or permanent, serious injury,
a person who violates subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor more
than one year, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than
ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. However, the
court, in the interests of justice and for reasons stated in the record, may reduce or
eliminate the minimum imprisonment required by this paragraph.
Id.
215. See Dowty, supra note 111 (charging a man under section 600 of the VTL even though he
was on his way back to the accident less than a half hour after the incident occurred).
216. See, e.g., Aric Richards, Hit-and-Run Driver Returns to Scene of Fatal Collision, FOX5
(Mar. 15, 2016, 7:26 AM), http://fox5sandiego.com/2016/03/15/chula-vista-police-investigate-fatalpedestrian-accident (reporting on a driver of a fatal hit-and-run accident who returned to the scene
of the incident almost immediately after fleeing).
217. See Anthony Neddo, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Charging the Death Penalty: Opening
the Doors to Arbitrary Decision Making in New York Capital Cases, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1949, 1953
(1997) (explaining how district attorneys in New York have historically enjoyed broad discretion in
prosecuting the state's penal law).
218. A short amnesty period is provided under 625 ILL. COWP. STAT. 5/11-401 (2014):
Any person who has failed to stop or to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)
shall, as soon as possible but in no case later than one-half hour after such motor vehicle
accident, or, if hospitalized and incapacitated from reporting at any time during such
period, as soon as possible but in no case later than one-half hour after being discharged
from the hospital, report the place of the accident.
Id.
219. See id. ("[Any person failing to comply with paragraph (b) is guilty of a Class 2 felony if
the motor vehicle accident does not result in the death of any person. Any person failing to comply
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benefits from such a provision, before analyzing the possible problem of
incentivizing drunk drivers to flee and avoid larger penalties. 2 0
1. New York Should Add a Provision That Allows a Driver Who
Self-Reports Within a Short Period of Time to Be Charged
Under the Misdemeanor Section
The proposed amendment would be based on the current Illinois
statute and read as follows:
Any person who has failed to stop or to comply with the requirements
of this section [2(a)] shall, as soon as possible but in no case later
than one hour after such motor vehicle accident, report all the
required information under this section at a police station or sheriff's
office near the place where such accident occurred.If the driverfulfills
his or her duties under this section, the driver will not be punished
under section 2(c), instead, the offense shall constitute a Class A
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than five hundred nor
more than one thousand dollars in addition to any other penalties
22
providedby law. 1

While there is little to no empirical data that shows how many
drivers actually take advantage of the grace period under the Illinois
statute,222 there are a number of arguments that validate this provision. 2 3
The first and most important reason for this partial amnesty provision is

the humanity element.22 4 Striking a pedestrian or being involved in a
serious automobile accident is a very stressful experience, and people
tend to react differently when placed in very stressful situations. 225 The

courts in many states repeatedly stress how the hit-and-run offense is a
misnomer as the offense is the running and not the hitting.2 26 The law

with paragraph (b) when the accident results in the death of any person is guilty of a Class 1
felony.").
220. See infra Part IV.C.2.
221. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401.
222. See Kaplan, supranote 6 (explaining that enforcement agencies do not keep statistics on
the arrest rates of hit-and-run drivers); E-mail from Ken W. Martin, Interim Chief Bureau of Safety
Programs & Admin. Servs. Div. of Traffic Safety, to author (Sept. 29, 2015, 11:44 AM) (on file
with author) (stating that the state statistic department does not keep such statistics).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 225-33.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27.
225. See Dennis J. Butler & H. Steven Moffic, Post-traumatic Stress Reactions Following
Motor Vehicle Accidents, 60 AM. FAM. PHYsICIAN 524, 524-26 (1999) (detailing the occurrences of
post-traumatic stress disorder after accidents); Young, supra note 3.
226. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 75 (Cal. 1995) ("[T]he popular term-'hit-andrun'-is obviously a misnomer."); People v. Comers, 221 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393 (Ct. App. 1985)
("[Piopularly denominated 'hit-and-run,' the act made criminal thereunder is not the 'hitting' but
the 'running."').
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should not severely penalize a driver who merely panics and makes
the bad decision to flee but recognizes his error and self-reports within
an hour.227
There is also a strong economic argument for holding the driver
liable, which can only be realized when there is culpable driver-a
228 Getting
criminal defendant-as opposed to when there is none.
2 29
injured in an accident can prove very costly. There are hospital bills,
automobile damages, lost wages, diminished capacity, and emergency
services costs. 23 ° When there is no defendant, there is no one culpable,
and hence no one's insurance to cover these losses other than the
victim's, assuming the victim has insurance. 231 The uncovered losses
are shouldered by all other drivers in the form of higher insurance
premiums. 23 2 Creating an incentive for drivers who panic and flee from
the site of the accident to return, assuming drivers take advantage of this
opportunity, would also result in less accidents where the victim is left
without a culpable driver.2 33
2. The Possible Effect of Incentivizing Drunk Drivers to
Purposefully Flee
This Subpart examines the possible issue of creating an incentive
for drunk drivers to flee the scene of accidents resulting in death or
injury to avoid being prosecuted under the more serious statute of
vehicular manslaughter, a class C felony. 234 Further, this Subpart
explains that (1) even without the partial amnesty provision, this
incentive exists and the amnesty provision will not affect the drunk
227. See People v. Moreno, 40 N.E.3d 241, 242, 244-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (stating that the
purpose of the Illinois half-hour amnesty provision is to encourage drivers who fled to return and
self-report and that "[t]he statute should be construed to afford maximum encouragement to those
contacted by the police to be forthright rather than to stonewall or attempt to elude the police").
228. See infra text accompanying notes 229-33.
229. See infra notes 230-31.
230.

NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 1, 2, 235-40 (examining the

monumental economic effects of accidents including; hospital bills, quality of life loss, state costs,
property damage, legal costs, emergency services costs, and more; the report estimates an economic
loss of $242 billion in 2010 alone); see supranote 10.
231. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 238-39 (explaining that
even when there is a culpable driver the victim incurs up to ten percent of the medical costs, over
fifty percent of the productivity loss, and about thirty percent of the property loss for a total of
twenty-two percent of the accident cost).
232. See People v. Carbajal, 899 P.2d 67, 73 (Cal. 1995); Cost of Auto Crashes & Statistics,
supra note 10.
233. See supra note 222 (explaining how there are really no statistics as to how many people
actually take advantage of the Illinois amnesty statute, however, the assumption is that if there is an
amnesty period people will take advantage of it).
234. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.12-.13 (McKinney 2009).
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driver's choice to stay or flee; 23 5 and (2) even if this provision were to
create a greater incentive for drunk drivers to flee, there are no accurate
statistics as to how many hit-and-run drivers are drunk or merely panic,
and so this humanitarian and cost-saving provision is still sensible.236
Suppose a driver who knows that he is intoxicated above the legal
limit is involved in a vehicular accident. He gets out of his vehicle and
realizes there is an injured, dying, or dead victim and is now faced with
the choice of staying or fleeing. Under current N.Y. law, prior to any
statutory amendments, the answer is clear-though morally
reprehensible. It makes sense for the drunk driver to flee and take a
chance on getting caught and being charged under section 600 of the
VTL-at most, a class D felony.237 If the driver stays, he faces certain
class D felony charges and possibly class C felony charges, 238 whereas if
he flees it will be almost impossible for the prosecution to prove
intoxication at the time of the accident.23 9
The N.Y. legislature understands this concern, and this was and
remains the primary reason behind the recent push to stiffen the
penalties on all hit-and-run drivers from a class D to class C felony, to
be on par with first degree vehicular manslaughter. 24 ° This solution is
short-sighted since even if the drunk driver is facing a class C felony, the
fact that most hit-and-run drivers do not get caught still remains a
primary incentive to flee. 24 1 This solution also has the effect of
235. See infra text accompanying notes 237-45.
236. Cohn, supra note 3 ("No research can show how often drivers who fled accidents were
under the influence of alcohol or distracted by technology.").
237. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 600(2)(c) (McKinney 2005) (discussing subsection 2(c),
under which a fatal accident results in a charge that is a class D felony).
238. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12-13. Section 125.12 is second degree vehicular manslaughter,
a class D felony, so there is no incentive to flee. Id. § 125.12. Section 125.13 is first degree
vehicular manslaughter, a class C felony, but is only charged under aggravated circumstances. Id.
§ 125.13.
239. See State v. Hatfield, 351 S.W.3d 774, 780-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (overturning the
conviction since the police officer never witnessed the driver operating the vehicle while
intoxicated-he merely saw him drunk near the car).
240. See S. 2136, 2015 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (proposing the imposition of higher
sentences on hit-and-run drivers by classifying it as a class C felony where the accident results in
death and a class D felony where it results in serious injury); see also N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2005 S.
4584, ch. 49 (explaining the deficiency in the current law). The Introducer's Memorandum in
Support of Senate Bill 4584, contained in the Bill Jacket, explains as follows:
Under current law, for example, an intoxicated driver causing an accident, resulting in
death of another person, who stays at the scene faces a more serious charge. Second
degree vehicular manslaughter, a class D felony, than if the person left the scene and
sobered up . [sic] a class E felony. The bill obviates the problems with current law
which, in essence, rewards an intoxicated driver for fleeing the scene.
Id.
241. See Koran, supra note 122 (explaining how the vast majority of hit-and-nm drivers never
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punishing all those drivers who only fled from panic, and since there are
no statistics as to which demographic makes up the majority of hit-and242
run drivers, this solution is really missing the point.
The incentive to flee, assuming intoxicated drivers are even so
cunningly calculating, is not affected by a partial amnesty provision that
243
mitigates the charge to a misdemeanor. The choice to flee remains a
244
simple mathematical calculation of probabilities and jail time. This
partial amnesty is a side point and does not affect the validity of
245
providing a measure of relief for drivers who panic and flee.
Furthermore, even if, arguendo, this amnesty provision were to add
some incentive for drunk drivers to flee, it will provide them no relief
when they return and self-report. The mitigation and amnesty period
proposed would only be one hour. Since the body only metabolizes
246
alcohol at a rate of about .01% per hour, if this hypothetical drunk
driver returns, chances are there would still be enough alcohol in his
blood to support a driving under the influence ("DUI) conviction and,
247
consequently, a vehicular homicide or manslaughter charge. Even for
the subset of intoxicated drivers who are just above the legal limit at the
time of the incident and return under the limit, is it not better that they
return and take responsibility for their actions at least on a civil level?
Assuming that this driver is not punished as severely as the law would
248
have wanted, strong economic arguments still remain.

get caught and that this creates an incentive to flee); Wang, supranote 122.
242. See Cohn, supra note 3 (stating that there are no statistics as to how many hit-and-run
drivers are in fact intoxicated).
243. See Kaplan, supra note 6 (describing how Professor James Fox, dean of the criminal
justice college at Northeastern University, explains that most drivers do not understand the different
penalties and severities, rather they flee to avoid getting caught at all).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
245. See supra Part III.C.
246.

See Alcohol Alert, NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, http://pubs.

niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa35.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (using a graph to show
metabolization of alcohol in the body). Obviously, there are factors that affect increased
metabolization but this is a safe estimate based on the graph. See id; see also Health Promotion and
Prevention Services, GEO. WASH. U., http://prevention.gwu.edu/alcohol-absorption (last visited

Nov. 26, 2016) ("Generally speaking, alcohol is absorbed into the blood relatively quickly and
metabolized more slowly. In an average 150 pound person, for example, each drink adds 0.02% to
BAC and hour that passes removes 0.01% from it.").
247. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney 2009); see People v. Baker, 826 N.Y.S.2d 550,
551 (Cty. Ct. 2006) (stating that there exists a rebuttable presumption that when the defendant is
drunk, that the intoxication is what caused the accident, and they can be charged under this statute).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 228-33.
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3. New York Can Require Mandatory Blood Testing to Qualify
for the Mitigation Under the Amnesty Provision
This Subpart argues that if the N.Y. legislature remains
unconvinced by the arguments set forth, above, it could include a
provision in the amendment requiring a mandatory blood alcohol
concentration ("BAC") test for a driver to qualify for the mitigation.2 49 If
the driver has any level of alcohol at all in his blood, even below the
legal limit, he or she would not qualify for the mitigation and be charged
under the felony statute. The statute would read as follows:
For a driver to qualify for the mitigation of chargesfrom a Felony to a

Class A Misdemeanor under this section [2(a)], the driver must not
only self-report to the police within one hour from the time of the
incident, the driver must also submit to a blood chemical test. The
driver will only qualify for the mitigation ifthere is no alcohol in said

driver's blood at all.
Under section 1194 of the N.Y. VTL, 2 ° a court may order a
chemical test on the driver of an automobile involved in an accident
resulting in serious injury or death when there is a reasonable belief that
the driver may have been intoxicated.251 In a situation where the driver
involved in an accident self-reports to the police within one hour-and
seeks the mitigation granted by the statute, if there is reason to believe
the driver is intoxicated (watery eyes, open container, slurred speech,
alcohol smell), then the police may obtain a blood warrant for a forced
chemical test. 25 2 But, even if there is no reasonable suspicion of
drunkenness, under the proposed amendment to the statute, the driver
would have to voluntarily submit to a chemical test in order to qualify
for the mitigation. 3
Either way, the driver is subjected to a blood alcohol test prior to
any mitigation of the charges.2 54 Consequently, intoxicated drivers will
gain absolutely nothing from this amendment. 5 The only individuals
249. See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401 (2014).
250. N.Y. VEH.& TRAF.LAW § 1194(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2011).
251. Id.
252. See People v. Rollins, 499 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818-19 (App Div. 1986) ("[G]iven the manner
in which the accident occurred, the strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and his watery
eyes, the trooper had probable cause to arrest defendant despite the fact that he did not observe
defendant walk and talk.").
253. See supratext accompanying note 249.
254. See supratext accompanying note 249.
255. See Barry Kamins, 2005 Legislation Affecting the Practice of Criminal Law, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Jan. 2006, at 20-21 (explaining how under recent amendments, drunkenness alone is enough to
support a conviction for vehicular manslaughter in New York). If a driver is drunk not only will he
not qualify for the mitigation, but he can be charged under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (McKinney

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss1/15

32

Plutchok: Is a "Hit-and-Wait" Really Any Better Than a "Hit-and-Run"?

20161

"HIT-AND-WAIT" BETTER THANA "HIT-AND-RUN"?

363

that will obtain relief through this proposed amendment are people like
Dante Altieri, whose only mistake was panicking but who had the moral
aptitude to immediately return to the scene and report his involvement to
the police.256
V.

CONCLUSION

While overall traffic accident fatalities are down from historic highs
in the 1940s, hit-and-run accidents are generally on the rise. 7 In some
states, this problem has been described as an epidemic.2 58 Over 1500
deaths a year are due to hit-and-run drivers and countless more people
are injured. 2 9 Furthermore, less than fifty percent of these drivers are
ever caught, and this causes untold economic hardship as well as further
emotional pain to the victims and their families. 260 The problem of hitand-run drivers is a true problem and does not seem to be going away
anytime soon.
Hit-and-run statutes were enacted to battle this problem; by
criminalizing fleeing, the legislature sought to limit such behavior. 61
But the N.Y. statute, section 600 of the VTL, has a glaring defect.262
Section 600 does not require the driver involved in an accident to assist
the injured victim in any way. 263 The law merely requires the driver to
remain at the scene and accurately report their insurance information to
the authorities. 264 Forty-five states require the driver to provide
"reasonable assistance" to the injured victim, and many even require the
driver to transport the victim to medical facilities. 265 New York is one of
only five states that does not require any assistance.266
This Note proposes that New York amend section 600 to include a
duty on the driver to provide reasonable assistance to an injured
2009), even if all the prosecution can show is drunkenness. Kamins, supra.
256. See supranotes 110-13 and accompanying text.
257. See U.S. Department of Transportation, PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower and the Federal
Role in Highway Safety, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/safety04.

cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
258. See Larry Copeland, FatalHit-and-Run Crashes on Rise in U.S., USA TODAY (Nov. 10,
2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/10/hit-and-run-crashes-los-

angeles/3452699 (explaining that the rise in hit-and-run accidents is becoming an epidemic in some
states and also discussing the otherwise falling national crash statistics).
259. See Press Release, AAA Found. for Traffic Safety, supra note 2.
260.

See supra Part IHI.C.

261.

See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.

262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part M.A.
See supra Part HI A.
See supra note 136.

266. See supra note 136.
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victim.267 While most of the states' statutes require the driver to actually
transport the victim, this Note recommends the amendment only require
the driver to summon help remotely.268 This would bypass any problems
2 69
of potential liability stemming from non-professional help.
Further, while not an actual deficiency of section 600, this Note
also proposes that New York add a provision that provides for a short
one hour partial amnesty for drivers to return and self-report.27 ° This
provision is modeled after the current Illinois statute, which provides
that if the driver returns within a half hour, the charge is partially
mitigated from a felony to a misdemeanor. 27 ' The proposed amendment
would allow a driver to return within one hour and not be charged under
the harshest part of section 600, which results in a felony charge. Rather,
the driver would be charged with a class A misdemeanor.2 72
Both of these amendments are important, as either one would add
necessary changes to the current law.273 However, while Illinois is the
only state that has a partial amnesty provision, forty-five states and the
UVC have a "duty to aid" provision. 274 Therefore, while arguments can
be made against the amnesty provision, there is no reason for New York
not to join the vast majority of states and require the driver to assist the
injured victim.

275

Samuel E. Plutchok*

267. See supra Part IV.A.
268. See supra Part IV.A.2.
269. See supra Part IV.A.2.
270. See supra Part IV.C.1.
271. See supra text accompanying note 109.
272. See supra Part TV.C.1.
273. See supra Part IV.A-C.
274. See supranote 136.
275. See supraPart IV.A.
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Julian Ku, B.A., I.D., Maurice A. Deane DistinguishedProfessor of Constitutional Law, Faculty
Directorof InternationalPrograms
Katrina Fischer Kuh, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Dean and Eric J. Schmertz DistinguishedProfessor of Public
Law and PublicService
Theo Liebmann, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessor ofLaw and Directorof ClinicalPrograms
Claude (Benji) Louis, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Academic Support and Bar
PreparationPrograms
Malachy T. Mahon, B.A., J.D., Founding Dean Emeritus
Irina D. Manta, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Director of the Centerfor Intellectual Property
Law andResearch Fellow
Kevin McElroy, B.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Legal Writing
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., B.A., Dipl., J.D., LL.M., Professorof Law and Research Fellow
Elizabeth Nevins, B.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessorofLaw
Ashira Ostrow, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty
Development
James Sample, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Academic Affairs and Max Schmertz
DistinguishedProfessoro Law
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Deanfor Information Services, Directorof the Law
Library& Associate Professorof Law
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Norman I. Silber, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professorof Law
Ronald H. Silverman, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus of Law
Roy D. Simon, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law and Gregory Research Scholar
Amy R. Stein, B.A., J.D., Professor of Legal Writing, Assistant Deanfor Legal Writing andAdjunct
Instruction
John Tsiforas, B.A., J.D., Assistant Director of Academic Success Programand Visiting Professor
ofAcademic Support
Vern R. Walker, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Law and Director of the Research
Laboratoryfor Law, Logic and Technology
Lauris Wren, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorof Law
Ellen Yaroshefsky, B.A., J.D., Howard Lichtenstein DistinguishedProfessor ofLegal Ethics
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LETTER FROM THE VOLUME 45
BOARD OF EDITORS
This special edition, "The Life and Legacy of Monroe H.
Freedman," is a collection of works originally published, in Volume 44
of the Hofstra Law Review that pay tribute to the late Professor
Freedman and his field of study.
Professor Freedman served as the former dean of the Maurice A.
Deane School of Law at Hofstra University from 1973 to 1977 and
remained on the faculty until he passed away in 2015. During his tenure,
he was named the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal
Ethics. The title was held by Professor Freedman until 2003, when he
resigned from the Lichtenstein Chair so that a colleague would have the
opportunity to be appointed. This act perfectly captures the unyielding
integrity for which Professor Freedman was so well known and, more
broadly, the thoughtfulness that guided all his decisions. Following his
death and in recognition of his extraordinary contributions to legal
ethics, Hofstra Law established the Monroe H. Freedman Institute for the
Study of Legal Ethics.
Over the course of his career, Professor Freedman received
countless accolades for innovative scholarship in the field of legal ethics.
He was a revolutionary, who shed light on a field previously overlooked.
Often considered the father of modem legal ethics, Professor Freedman
challenged lawyers to reflect on their ethical responsibilities as members
of the legal profession. His teachings emphasized that lawyers have an
obligation to represent all clients with zeal and undivided loyalty.
The Hofstra Law Review dedicated Volume 44 to the memory of
Professor Freedman. Throughout Volume 44 are numerous works that
celebrate Professor Freedman and continue the dialogue he began so
many years ago. This special edition of the Hofstra Law Review contains
all such works in a single publication. It is divided into four Parts, each
of which represents a separate Issue of Volume 44. The entire collection
begins with a Table of Contents that lists each work, organized by Part.
Each individual Part then begins with an excerpted Table of Contents
from the Issue of Volume 44 in which those pieces initially appeared.
Professor Freedman will long be remembered by faculty and
students at Hofstra Law, where he spent forty-two years of his life. His
inspirational voice will be heard for decades, pushing us all to never stop
asking the hard questions.
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